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We consider a setting in which agents vote to choose a fair mixture of public outcomes. The
agents have dichotomous preferences: each outcome is liked or disliked by an agent. We discuss
three outstanding voting rules. The Conditional Utilitarian rule, a variant of the random dictator,
is strategyproof and guarantees to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional
to its size. It is easier to compute and more efficient than the familiar Random Priority rule.
Its worst case (resp. average) inefficiency is provably (resp. in numerical experiments) low if
the number of agents is low. The efficient Egalitarian rule protects individual agents but not
coalitions. It is excludable strategyproof : I do not want to lie if I cannot consume outcomes I
claim to dislike. The efficient Nash Max Product rule offers the strongest welfare guarantees to
coalitions, who can force any outcome with a probability proportional to their size. But it even
fails the excludable form of strategyproofness.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Interactive democracy (see e.g., [8]) is a new approach to voting well suited for low
stakes/ high frequency decisions, and easily implemented on the internet [29]. An
especially successful instance is budgetary participation [19] where the stake-holders
(citizens, employees of a firm, club members) vote to decide which subset of public
projects the community, firm, or club should implement.
We discuss a stylized version of this process in the probabilistic voting model [25, 27].
The guiding principle of our analysis is that the selection of a single (deterministic)
public outcome is prima facie unfair: fairness requires compromise, we must select a
mixture of several mutually exclusive outcomes. The mixture may come from actual
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randomization, or the allocation of time-shares, or the distribution of a fixed amount
of some resource (e.g., money) over these outcomes. Some typical examples follow.
In reference [19], the city authority must divide funds or staff between several
projects (library, sport center, concert hall) taking into account the citizens’ wishes.
The scheduling of one or several weekly club meetings (gym classes, chess club,
study group) must accomodate the time constraints reported by the club members.
Or the local public TV, after polling its audience, must divide broadcasting time
between different languages, or different types of program (news, sports, movies). In
the fair knapsack problem, the server schedules repeatedly jobs of different reported or
observed sizes under a capacity constraint, and must pick a (random) serving protocol.
In all these examples, fairness requires to give some share of the public resources to
everyone: each club member should have access to some meetings; everyone should
enjoy at least some TV programs, etc.. This contrasts with traditional high stakes/low
frequency voting contexts, where the first best is to select a single (deterministic)
outcome, and randomization over outcomes is only second best.1
We run into the familiar conflict between protecting minorities and submitting to the
will of the majority [28, 38, 43]. On the one hand, the larger the support for a public
outcome, the bigger should be its share in the final compromise: numbers matter. On
the other hand, we must protect minorities with their idiosyncratic preferences for
outcomes disliked by the majority. So the club meetings will be more frequent when
many members can attend, but nobody will be entirely excluded; the knapsack server
will favor short jobs because this increases the number of satisfied customers, but it
cannot ignore long jobs entirely; and so on.
We analyze this tradeoff when preferences can be represented in a very simple
Facebook-style dichotomous form: each agent likes or dislikes each outcome, and her
utility is simply the total share of her likes. Agents in the knapsack problem care
only about their expected service time, and in the club example, about the number
of meetings they can attend. Though less natural in the public TV and the library
funding examples, where they rule out any complementarities between outcomes,
dichotomous preferences are still of practical interest because they are easy to elicit.
We discuss the fairness and incentive compatibility properties of three mostly well
known social choice rules.
Our results. The Fair Share guarantee principle is central to the fair division literature
since the earliest cake division papers [40]. In our model this is the Individual Fair
Share (IFS) axiom: each one of the n agents “owns” a 1/n-th share of decision power,
so she can ensure an outcome she likes at least 1/n-th of the time (or with probability
at least 1/n). To capture more subtle ideas that minorities should be protected, and
numbers should matter as well, we strengthen IFS to Unanimous Fair Share (UFS),
giving to any group of like-minded agents an influence proportional to its size: so if
10% of the agents have identical preferences they should like the outcome at least 10%
of the time.
Our starting point is the impossibility result in [15], where our model and the two
fairness properties IFS and UFS appear first: no mixing rule can be efficient, incentive
1It is used to break ties, or to play the role of an absent deterministic Condorcet winner: for instance
[4, 18, 31] identifies a lottery that, in a certain sense, wins the majority tournament.
compatible in the prior-free sense of Strategyproofness (SP), and meet Unanimous, or even
Individual, Fair Share (Proposition 6, [15]). One of our first results is that the impossi-
bility disappears under the natural analogue for single-peaked preferences: outcomes
can be ordered in such a way that the like-set of every agent is an interval. For such
structured preferences, the random priority rule satisfies all the conditions. We then
introduce new fairness and incentives properties and offer instead possibility results
even when there is no structure on the dichotomous preferences. Three remarkable
mixing rules (two of them well known) meet IFS and achieve, loosely speaking, two
out of the three goals of efficiency, group fairness (in the sense of UFS or other more
demanding properties), and incentive compatibility.
We start with the Egalitarian (EGAL) rule, adapting to ourmodel a celebrated principle
of distributive justice. Taking the probability that the selected outcome is liked by agent
i as her canonical utility, the rule maximizes first the utility level we can guarantee
to all agents; among the corresponding mixtures, it maximizes the utility we can
guarantee to all agents but one; and so on. It is efficient and satisfies IFS, therefore it
is not strategyproof, by the above mentioned result. However if public outcomes are
non rival but excludable, we can force agents to consume only those outcomes they
claim to like, so it becomes more costly to fake a dislike and the strategyproofness is
correspondingly weakened. Ameeting of the club is such an excludable public outcome:
it is easy to exclude from the meeting those who reported they could not attend;
broadcasting via cable TV is similarly excludable, not so via aerial broadcasting. The
Egalitarian rule is efficient as well as Excludable Strategyproof (EXSP): misreporting
one’s preferences does not pay, provided an agent is excluded from consuming those
public outcomes she reportedly dislikes (Theorem 1). Thus weakening SP to EXSP
resolves the impossibility result. But numbers do not matter to the egalitarian rule:
it treats a unanimous group of agents exactly as if it contained a single agent, so
the UFS property obviously fails. A related problem is that if I have a clone (another
agent with preferences identical to mine), I can simply stay home and nothing will
change. The Strict Participation (PART∗) axiom takes care of this disenfranchisement
problem by insisting that casting his vote is strictly beneficial to each voter. So the
EGAL rule is only appealing if we focus on individual guarantees and are comfortable
treating a homogenous group as a single person. This makes sense if the club must
offer some important training to its members. But in the budgetary participation or
the broadcasting examples, numbers should definitely matter.
The Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule is a simple variant of the classic “random
dictator”. Each agent identifies, among the outcomes he likes, those with the largest
support from the other agents: then he spreads the probability (time share) of 1/n
uniformly over these outcomes. So the utilitarian concern is conditional upon guaran-
teeing one’s full utility first: charity begins at home. The CUT rule is related to, but
much simpler than, the Random Priority (RP) rule which is discussed in [15] and which
averages outcomes of all deterministic priority rules. Both rules are SP, meet PART∗
and guarantee UFS. It follows from Proposition 6 [15], that they are inefficient. But we
show that CUT is strictly more efficient than RP. In numerical simulations (Section 9)
and for relatively small values of n, its inefficiency is consistently low.
The third rule that we analyse is the familiar Nash Max Product (NMP) rule that
picks the mixture that maximizes the product of individual utilities. It is efficient
and offers much stronger welfare guarantees to groups than UFS. We introduce two
requirements, each one a considerable strengthening of UFS. The Core Fair Share (CFS)
property has an incentive flavor in the spirit of cumulative voting [28, 39]: any group
of agents can pool their shares of decision power and object to the proposed mixture
z by enforcing another mixture z ′ with a probability proportional to the group size.
Core Fair Share rules out any such objection. Finally Average Fair Share (AFS) applies
to any coalition with a common liked outcome: the average utility in such a group
cannot be smaller than its relative size. In simple examples, AFS limits very effectively
the set of acceptable efficient mixtures. Theorem 3 shows that the efficient NMP rule
meets PART∗, CFS and AFS but even fails EXSP. It has been an open problem for weak
preferences whether Very Strong Stochastic Dominance Participation and Stochastic
Dominance Efficiency are compatible or not [16, 18]. Since NMP satisfies both PART∗
and efficiency, we show that the question is resolved in the affirmative for the case of
dichotomous preferences.
RP CUT UTIL EGAL NMP
Properties
Anonymity (ANON) and Neutrality (NEUT) + + + + +
EFF (Efficiency) – – + + +
MIX-PO (Mix over Pareto optimal outcomes) + + + + +
EXSP (Excludable SP) + + + +⃝ –⃝
SP (Strategyproofness) + + + – –
IFS (Individual Fair Share) + + – + +
UFS (Unanimous Fair Share) + + – – +⃝
AFS (Avg. Fair Share) –⃝ –⃝ –⃝ –⃝ +⃝
CFS (Core Fair Share) –⃝ –⃝ –⃝ –⃝ +⃝
PART (Participation) + + + + +⃝
PART∗ (Strict participation) + +⃝ – – +⃝
DEC (Decentralisation) +⃝ +⃝ –⃝ –⃝ +⃝
Known Polynomial-time Algorithm – + + + –
Table 1. Properties satisfied by rules. Key results from this paper are circled.
Our results suggest several challenging open questions about the impossibility fron-
tiers of our model. An overview of the properties satisfied by the rules discussed is
given in Table 1. Figure 1 positions the rules we discuss within the classes of rules
satisfying various properties.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
Budgetary participation is an important new aspect of participative democracy, re-
viewed in [19]. Our model casts this process as a probabilistic voting problem, intro-
duced first by Gibbard [27] as a way to design non dictatorial strategyproof decision
rules. The literature he inspired viewed randomization as a way around the defects of
deterministic rules, mostly to allow anonymous and neutral rules, or to circumvent
the absence of Condorcet winners [see e.g, 4, 7, 17, 25, 31]. But recent work turns its
attention to mixtures of outcomes with time-sharing or compromise in mind [see e.g,
2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 23].
EXSP
SP
IFS
EFF
PO-MIX
AFS
CFS
UFS
CUT, RP
EGAL
NMP
UTIL
Fig. 1. Venn diagram of sets of rules satisfying different properties.
Ourwork takes direct inspiration from the original paper of Bogomolnaia et al. [14, 15]
who introduced the model of randomised voting under dichotomous preferences. In
the same mathematical model we present several new results about new normative
requirements such as participation incentives, weaker forms of strategyproofness, and
stronger forms of fairness.
Two of our rules, EGAL and NMP, maximize respectively a familiar social welfare
ordering and a classic collective utility function. The egalitarian rule is the lead
mechanism in the related assignment model with dichotomous preferences in [12].
In probabilistic voting, the Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation rule of Aziz and
Stursberg [7] can be seen as an adaptation of the egalitarian rule [10].
Recent literature emphasizes that the NMP rule is central to the competitive approach
of the fair division of private commodities, whether divisible or indivisible [13, 20].
See in particular the discussion in [36]. We find here a new application of this rule
in the public decision making context, closer in spirit to Nash’s original bargaining
model [37]. Our results are related to those of [23], who also propose the NMP rule
for budgetary participation, reinterpret this rule as a Lindahl equilibrium, and discuss
its computational complexity. They allow for more general preferences than ours (in
particular, full-fledged vNMutilities), and show the Core Fair Share property (Corollary
1 Section 2.3) just like in statement i ) of our Theorem 3. They do not discuss incentives
properties or any alternative rule.
The rules CUT and RP are non-welfarist, in that they do not maximize any social
welfare ordering. The RP rule is well known (and was discussed in [15]), and CUT is a
fairly simple twist on the random dictator first introduced by [22] who noted that it is
strategyproof but did not develop its normative appeal.
Fair Share is an early design constraint of decision mechanisms: see the mathematical
literature on cake cutting [40], and on fair division of microeconomic commodi-
ties [35, 41, 42]. The group version of Fair Share captures the ubiquitous “protection
of minorities” principle that is formally related to cooperative stability in standard
voting. It is also related to the proportional veto principle [32, 33] and motivates
practical twists in the rules such as cumulative voting, especially concerned with the
protection of ethnic minorities in political elections [39], or minority stockholders
in corporate governance [28, 38, 43]. See also the same concerns for EU enlargement
[30]. Our fairness notions are closely related to proportional representation axioms in
multi-winner voting as well (see e.g., [6]).
Strict Participation has been considered in the deterministic voting model, leading
mostly to negative results. Our results complement those of Brandl et al. (2015) who
undertook a study of participation incentives in probabilistic voting.
3 THE MODEL
A generic agent is i ∈ N , and n = |N |. A pure public outcome is a ∈ A, and a
mixture of public outcomes is an element z of the simplex ∆(A), interpreted as a
lottery over A, a profile of time shares, or shares of other types of resources between
the outcomes in A. Both N and A are finite. A utility function ui = (uia )a∈A is an
element of {0, 1}A. Agents who dislike all outcomes play no role in any of the rules we
discuss, thus we exclude them at once: the domain of preferences is Ω = {0, 1}A⧹{0},
where 0 = 0A; and u ∈ ΩN is a profile of utility functions. In the examples we
always represent u as a N ×A matrix filled with 0-s and 1-s, and we use the notation:
uS =
∑
i ∈S ui and uSB =
∑
i ∈S
∑
a∈B uia for S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A. A problem M is
a triple M = (N ,A,u) where u ∈ ΩN . Actual utilities (welfare) at z are written
Ui = ui · z, and the corresponding utility profile is written U = u · z ∈ [0, 1]N . The
set of feasible utility profiles is Φ(M ) = {U = u · z |z ∈ ∆(A)}. GivenU ∈ Φ(M ) we set
φ−1 (U ) = {z ∈ ∆(A) |U = u · z}.
In problem M = (N ,A,u) a feasible utility profile U ∈ Φ(M ) is efficient if there is
no profile U ′ ∈ Φ(M ) such that U ≤ U ′ and at least one inequality Ui ≤ U ′i is strict.
A mixture z ∈ ∆(A) is efficient inM if the profile u · z is efficient. Fix ε ∈ [0, 1]; the
profile U ∈ Φ(M ) is (1 − ε )-inefficient if there exists U ′ ∈ Φ(M ) such that U ≤ εU ′.
Note that a utility profile is more (1 − ε )-inefficient if ε is smaller.
A rule F picks one U ∈ Φ(M ) for each problem M ; the mapping f picks the corre-
sponding mixtures: f (M ) = φ−1 (F (M )), so that F (M ) = u · f (M ). Moreover F and f
are Anonymous (treat agents symmetrically) and Neutral (treat outcomes symmet-
rically). The rule F is efficient if it selects an efficient profile in every problem. For
any n the rule is (1 − ε (n))-inefficient if a) there exists a problem M of size n and a
profileU ∈ Φ(M ) such that F (M ) is (1 − ε (n))-inefficient, and b) no smaller number
ε ′(n) meets this property.
A rule is “welfarist” by design, in the sense that it does not distinguish between
mixtures resulting in the same utility profile. For instance if two outcomes a,b are
“clones” in problemM (liked by exactly the same agents), a rule is oblivious to shifting
some weight from a to b.
The efficient pure outcomes in A are easy to recognize: a is efficient if and only if
there is no b such that the set of agents liking b is strictly larger than the set liking a.
We call such outcomes undominated. Consider the following example.
Example 3.1.
N ↓ A→ a b c d e
1 0 0 0 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 0
3 1 1 0 0 0
4 1 0 1 0 0
5 0 1 0 1 1
(1)
Outcome e is dominated byd , and the four other outcomes are undominated. However,
convex combinations of undominated outcomes maywell be inefficient. In the example,
any mixture z such that zb , zc are both positive, say zb , zc ≥ α > 0, can be improved by
redistributing the weight α to a and to d . That is, z is Pareto inferior to the mixturez ′ =
(za + α , zb − α , zc − α , zd + α , ze ).
Of special interest are those problems where any mixture of undominated pure
outcomes is efficient: in the probabilistic interpretation of our model this means that
ex post efficiency implies ex ante efficiency. Indeed the four rules we discuss below
mix only undominated outcomes, so in such problems their efficiency is guaranteed.
In our first (minor) result, the set of outcomes liked by an agent is called her like-set.
Lemma 1 All mixtures of undominated (pure) outcomes are efficient in problem M in
two cases:
i ) If |A| ≤ 3 and/or |N | ≤ 4;
ii ) If A can be ordered in such a way that the like-set of every agent is an interval.
Statement i ) is proven by Duddy [22]; it implies that Example 3.1 has the smallest
sizes of A and N for which a combination of undominated outcomes is inefficient. The
proof of statement ii) is relegated to the appendix. Since RP mixes over Pareto optimal
outcomes [15], it is efficient if the agent preferences satisfy condition (ii). Hence, under
the condition, the impossibility result mentioned in the introduction disappears.
4 EXCLUDABLE STRATEGYPROOFNESS; THE EGALITARIAN RULE
We start with the familiar prior-free incentive compatibility requirement that misre-
porting one’s preferences is never profitable if no agent can coordinate this move with
other agents.2 Notation: upon replacing in the profile u the coordinate ui by another
u ′i ∈ Ω, the resulting profile is (u |iu ′i ).
Strategyproofness (SP): ui · f (M ) ≥ max
z′∈f (N ,A, (u |iu′i ))
ui · z ′ for allM , i and u ′i .
The simplest strategyproof rule adapts approval voting to our model: it selects only
those outcomes liked by the largest number of agents. Write Φp (M ) for the set of
utility profiles implemented by pure outcomes in A: Φp (M ) = {U ∈ [0, 1]|∃a ∈ A∀i ∈
N ,Ui = uia }. We use avд(Y ) to be average operation of the a set Y of utility profiles,
i.e. avд(Y ) = 1|Y |
∑
y∈Y y. The utilitarian rule is defined as follows.
Utilitarian rule (UTIL): Fut (M ) = avд{arg max
U ∈Φp (M )
UN }.
2Recall from Propositions 2 and 3 in [15] that in our model group versions of SP are not compatible with
efficiency, even in the ex post sense.
Note that the rule deliberately treats a problem with two identical columns exactly as
the reduced problem where only one column remains.
The careful reader can check that this defines a rule in the sense of Definition 1, one
that is efficient and strategyproof. However UTIL ignores minority opinions entirely
so it fails to address the normative concerns described in the Introduction.
If an agent gets a fair 1/n-th share of total decision power, she will use it on an
outcome she likes. We take the following lower bound on individual welfare as the
first test that mixing is fair:
Individual Fair Share (IFS):U = F (M ) =⇒ Ui ≥ 1
n
for allM and all i .
The main result of [15] is that a rule cannot be together Efficient, Strategyproof, and
meet the Individual Fair Share. Our first result is that this impossibility disappears if
we weaken SP as explained below. To motivate this weakening, we adapt to our model
the familiar idea of equalizing individual utilities while respecting efficiency.
The lexicographic ordering in [0, 1]{1, · · · ,n } maximizes the first coordinate, and when
this is not decisive, the second one, and so on. For a utility profileU ∈ [0, 1]N the vector
U ∗ ∈ [0, 1]{1, · · · ,n } is obtained by rearranging its coordinates increasingly. Then the
leximin ordering ≻leximin compares U 1 and U 2 in [0, 1]N exactly as the lexicographic
ordering comparesU 1∗ andU 2∗ in [0, 1]{1, · · · ,n } .
Egalitarian rule (EGAL): F eд (M ) = arg max
U ∈Φ(M )
≻leximin .
This maximization yields a unique and efficient utility profile (see e. g., Lemma 1.1
in [34]). Anonymity and Neutrality are clear. To check Individual fair Share, pick for
each agent i a pure outcome ai she likes, and observe that the uniform average of
the ai -s ensures utility at least 1/n to each agent: therefore the egalitarian profileU eд
must haveU eд∗1 ≥ 1/n.
Here is the simplest problem where the rule EGAL is vulnerable to a misreport of
preferences:
true profile u =
N ↓ A→ a b c
1 1 1 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
→ misreport u˜ =
N ↓ A→ a b c
1 1 0˜ 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
.
At the true profile u outcome a is dominated and EGAL mixes b and c , z = (0, 12 ,
1
2 ).
After the misreport by agent 1, outcome a no longer appears dominated and EGAL
mixes equally the three outcomes, z˜ = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). Agent 1’s utility raises from 1/2 at
z to 2/3 at u˜, because he can enjoy outcome b despite pretending not to. The latter is
avoidable if the public outcome are excludable: based on reported preferences, the
mechanism excludes agents from consuming outcomes they claim to dislike. Recall
the discussion of this possibility in the examples of Section 1.
We use the notation ui ∧ u ′i for the coordinate-wise minimum of the two utility
functions. For our setting, for any outcome a, uia ∧ u ′ia = uia · u ′ia . The following
incentives property captures the resulting weaker incentive compatibility requirement:
Excludable Strategyproofness (EXSP)
ui · f (M ) ≥ max
z′∈f (N ,A, (u |iu′i ))
(ui ∧ u ′i ) · z ′ for allM , i and u ′i .
To make this definition more explicit, we identify the true utility ui by its like-set
Li = {a ∈ A|uia = 1}, and partition it as Li = L0i ∪ L−i . Agent i’s misreports is
L′i = L
0
i ∪ L+i where L+i ⊆ A⧹Li : she pretends to like L+i and to dislike L−i . The like-set
of ui ∧ u ′i is L0i therefore EXSP reads:
zL0i∪L−i ≥ z
′
L0i
for all z ∈ f (M ), z ′ ∈ f (N ,A, (u |iu ′i )).
It is useful to decompose EXSP in two statements. In the first one agent i misreports
only by inflating her like-set (Li = L0i ):
SP+: ui · f (M ) ≥ max
z′∈f (N ,A, (u |iu′i ))
ui · z ′ for allM , i and u ′i s.t. ui ≤ u ′i .
and in the second one, only by decreasing this set (L+i = ∅):
SP−: ui · f (M ) ≥ max
z′∈f (N ,A, (u |iu′i ))
u ′i · z ′ for allM , i and u ′i s.t. u ′i ≤ ui .
That EXSP equals the combination of SP+ and SP− is clear by applying first SP− from
ui to ui ∧u ′i , then SP+ from ui ∧u ′i to u ′i . SP not just implies SP− and SP+ but also SP∗:
SP∗: ui · f (M ) ≥ max
z′∈f (N ,A, (u |iu′i ))
ui · z ′ for allM , i and u ′i s.t. u ′i ≤ ui .
The example above shows that EGAL violates SP∗.
Theorem 1 The Egalitarian rule is Efficient, Excludable Strategyproof, and guarantees
Individual Fair Shares.
Proof
Preliminary notation and remarks: If M ⊆ N and U ∈ [0, 1]M then U ∗ is the set of
distinct coordinatesU ∗k ofU arranged increasingly; soU ∗ may be of lower dimension
thanM .
Fix a problem M = (N ,A,u). For any M ⊆ N and convex compact C ⊆ ∆(A) the
projection on M of the set of feasible utility profiles Φ(C ) = {U = u · z |z ∈ C} is
convex and compact, so it admits a unique leximin optimal element that we write
F eд (M,C,u) ∈ [0, 1]M . This extends the domain of the mapping F eд , and note that we
abuse notation by keeping u instead of its restriction toM ×A.
Recall the algorithm definingU = F eд (M,C,u). Start withU ∗1 = maxz∈C minj ∈M {uj ·
z}.Write N 1 for the set of agents achieving this minimum, P1 = N⧹N 1, and C1 =
{z ∈ C |uj · z = U ∗1 for all j ∈ N 1}. We stop if N 1 = N , otherwise we set U ∗2 =
maxz∈C1 minj ∈P 1 {uj · z}. We let N 2 be the set of agents achievingU ∗2, P2 = N⧹(N 1 ∪
N 2), andC2 the subset ofC1 achievingU ∗2 in N 2; we stop if P2 = ∅, otherwise we set
U ∗3 = maxz∈C2 minj ∈P 2 {uj · z}, and so on. We end up with a partition N = ∪Kk=1N k
such thatUi equalsU ∗k whenever i ∈ N k .
Turning to the proof of statement i ), we saw that it is enough to show separately
SP− and SP+. Fix an arbitraryM = (N ,A,u). An agent who likes all outcomes, ui = 1,
cannot benefit from any misreport; pick now i ∈ N such that uia = 0 for at least one
a, and a profile u˜ identical to u for all j ∈ N⧹i and such that ui ≨ u˜i (so at least one 0
in ui is changed to a 1). Let U = F eд (N ,A,u) and U˜ = F eд (N ,A, u˜) be implemented
respectively by some lotteries z and z˜. We prove successively:
U˜i ≥ Ui (2)
Ui = ui · z ≥ ui · z˜ (3)
The first inequality implies SP− (when i with true U˜i reportsUi ), the second gives SP+
(when i with trueUi reports U˜i ).
We clearly have U˜ ⪰leximin U , in particular U˜ ∗1 ≥ U ∗1: this proves (2) if Ui = U ∗1.
Assume for the rest of the proof Ui = U ∗ℓ where ℓ ≥ 2. We check first U˜ ∗1 = U ∗1.
If U˜ ∗1 > U ∗1 we pick ε ∈]0, 1], and note that the mixture z ′ = εz˜ + (1 − ε )z ensures
uj · z ′ > U ∗1 for all j ∈ N⧹i; for ε small enough we also have ui · z ′ > U ∗1 because
ui · z > U ∗1. This contradicts the definition ofU ∗1.
Set N 1 = {j |Uj = U ∗1} and N˜ 1 = {j |U˜j = U ∗1}. We use a similar argument to
show next N 1 ⊆ N˜ 1. If j ∈ N 1 and uj · z˜ > U ∗1, then for any ε ∈]0, 1] the mixture
z ′ = εz˜ + (1 − ε )z gives uk · z ′ ≥ U ∗1 for all k ∈ N⧹{j, i} and uj · z ′ > U ∗1; for ε small
enough we also have ui · z ′ > U ∗1 (becauseUi = U ∗ℓ > U ∗1) and then z ′ guarantees
exactly U ∗1 to a smaller set of agents than z, and strictly more to all others. This
implies that u · z ′ leximin-dominates u · z, contradiction.
Similarly the strict inclusion N 1 ⊊ N˜ 1 would imply that the vector U˜ is strictly
leximin-dominated byU , which we saw is not true.
So far we have shown that the maxi-minimization of feasible utilities – the first
step in the algorithm defining the leximin solution– gives at u and u˜ identical values
U ∗1 and U˜ ∗1, and identical sets N 1 and N˜ 1. Now the second step of the algorithms,
deliveringU ∗2, U˜ ∗2, and N 2, N˜ 2, is the same maxi-minimization problem applied in
both cases to C1 = {z ∈ ∆(A) |uj · z = U ∗1 for all j ∈ N 1} and P1 = N⧹N 1. Mimicking
the above proof we deduce that, if Ui = U ∗2 then U˜i ≥ Ui , and if Ui = U ∗ℓ for some
ℓ ≥ 3, then U ∗2 = U˜ ∗2, N 2 = N˜ 2. The induction argument establishing U ∗k = U˜ ∗k ,
N k = N˜ k up to k = ℓ − 1, and finally (2) is now clear.
To prove (3) we compare the profiles u · z and u · z˜. We just saw that they coincide
on N⧹P ℓ−1 = ∪ℓ−1k=1N k , and that if a mixture guarantees utility U ∗k to all agents in
N k for k = 1, · · · , ℓ − 1, it cannot guarantee (at u) more thanU ∗ℓ to all agents in P ℓ−1:
z and z˜ are two such lotteries, so if ui · z˜ > ui · z = U ∗ℓ , there is some j ∈ P ℓ−1 for
whom uj · z˜ < U ∗ℓ . But U˜ ∗ℓ ≥ U ∗ℓ (because U˜ weakly leximin-dominates U ) and
u˜j · z˜ = uj · z˜ ≥ U˜ ∗ℓ , thus we reach a contradiction. ■
5 STRICT PARTICIPATION AND UNANIMOUS FAIR SHARE
A striking feature of the Egalitarian rule is Clone Invariance: if at least one voter who
shares my preferences does vote, adding my own vote will not change the resulting
mixture. This holds because, fixing an agent i , the leximin ordering compares two
utility profilesU and U ′ in the same way as U˜ and U˜ ′, where from V to V˜ we add an
(n + 1)-th coordinate repeating Vi . Thus the rule is oblivious to the size of support for
a particular preference, an unpalatable feature in all the examples discussed in the
introduction.
We now define two requirements capturing, each in a different way, the concern that
numbers should matter. The first one is an incentive property.
Given a problemM and agent i , defineM (−i ) = (N⧹i,A,u−i ) andUi (−i ) = maxz∈f (M (−i )) ui ·
z.
Participation (PART): Fi (M ) ≥ Ui (−i ) for allM and i .
The violation of Participation is commonly called the No Show Paradox [26]: a voter
is better off abstaining to go to the polls. In the context of budgetary participation, we
want more: everyone should have a strict incentive to show up, lest many agents, will
stay home or put a blank ballot, and the result of the vote will not give an accurate
picture of the opinion profile.
Strict Participation (PART∗):
Fi (M ) ≥ Ui (−i ) and {Ui (−i ) < 1 =⇒ Fi (M ) > Ui (−i )} for allM and i .
Under dichotomous preferences that we consider, strong SD-participation and SD-
participation as studied by Brandl et al. [16] coincide with PART and very strong SD-
participation coincides with PART∗. A consequence of PART∗ is Clone Responsiveness:
I am strictly better off if one or more agents with preferences identical to mine cast
their vote. Thus the Egalitarian rule violates PART∗, although it satisfies PART.3
The second axiom, in the spirit of cumulative voting, allows groups of agents with
identical preferences to pool their respective shares of decision power. This leads to
the following strengthening of IFS, where we set againU = F (M ):
Unanimity Fair Share (UFS) :
for all S ⊆ N : {ui = uj for all i, j ∈ S } =⇒ Ui ≥ |S |
n
for all i ∈ S .
In the statement of UFS the unanimous group S can be a minority or a majority.
However unanimous preferences are much more likely in small than large groups, so
this property will be more relevant in practice to minorities.
All three rules discussed in the next two sections meet Strict Participation and
Unanimous Fair Share. Thus they cannot be both efficient and strategyproof. We start
with two strategyproof rules.
6 INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND FAIRNESS; THE CONDITIONAL
UTILITARIAN RULE
We introduce two rules adapting to our model the familiar random dictator mechanism
(see [27]). The difficulty is the treatment of indifferences: if I can dictate the outcome
for a 1/n-th share of the time, how should I choose in my like-set ?
The first rule, introduced by Duddy [22], applies a simple utilitarian test: I focus on
the outcomes liked by the largest number of other agents. Consider the set Φp (M ; i ) =
{U ∈ Φp (M ) |Ui = 1} of all the utility profiles corresponding to the like-set of agent i .
3Define U ∗ = argmaxU ∈Φ(M ) ≻leximin ; U −1 = argmaxU ∈Φ(M (−1)) ≻leximin and U 1 = U1 (−1). If
U 1 > U ∗1 we have successively U ⪰leximin (U 1, U ∗) then (U 1, U ∗) ≻leximin U ∗, contradiction.
Each agent spreads her share 1n equally between the profiles in Φ
p (M ; i ) with maximal
support:
Conditional Utilitarian (CUT) rule: F cut (M ) = 1
n
∑
i ∈N
avд{U |U ∈ arg max
U ′∈Φp (M ;i )
U ′N }.
Remark 1. Our definition of the domain Ω allows for agents who like all outcomes,
ui = 1A. The presence of such agents is of no consequence for the rules UTIL, EGAL, RP
and NMP, but it does impact the mixture selected by the CUT rule, as such agents put
their weight on the utilitarian outcomes (those with largest support). Suppose we choose
to exclude those agents in the definition of the CUT rule: this will not affect the incentives
and fairness properties of the rule identified below.
The next rule uses a familiar hierarchical rule to resolve indifferences, that plays
a critical role in probabilistic voting [5], as well as for assigning indivisible private
goods ([1], [11]). Let Θ(N ) be the set of strict orderings σ of N . For any σ ∈ Θ(N ) the
σ -Priority rule Fσ guarantees full utility to agent σ (1); next to agent σ (2) as well if 1
and 2 like a common outcome, else σ (2) is deemed irrelevant; next to agent σ (3) if
she likes an outcome that all relevant agents before her like, else she is irrelevant; and
so on.
Random Priority rule (RP)
F rp (M ) =
1
n!
∑
σ ∈Θ(N )
Fσ (M ) where Fσ (M ) = arg max
U ∈Φ(M )
≻σlexico .
If mixtures in ∆(A) represent lotteries, the RP rule picks an ordering σ with uniform
probability and computes U σ . But in other interpretations, time shares or the dis-
tribution of other resources, this simple implementation is not available. We retain
nevertheless the intuitive probabilistic terminology.
After checking that both rules are incentive compatible and fair, we compare them
from the efficiency angle, and recap our discussion in Theorem 2. RP is strategyproof [11]
and satisfies PART∗ [16]. For UFS, it is enough to observe that a member of coalition S
is first in σ with probability |S |n . We check now that CUT meets the same three prop-
erties. UFS is clear. We relegate the argument for SP to the appendix. Next, we verify
that CUT satisfies PART∗. Fix a problemM , an agent i , and for every j ∈ N⧹i let Bj be
the set of outcomes agent j loads in problemM (−i ). Set N + = {j ∈ N⧹i |Bj ∩ Li , ∅}
and N − = N⧹(N + ∪ i ). Before participating agent i’s utility was
1
n − 1
∑
j ∈N +
λj where λj =
|Bj ∩ Li |
|Bj | .
After i shows up every j in N + loads only Bj ∩ Li , and agents in N − may give some of
their load to Li therefore i’s utility is at least 1n (1 + |N + |). The inequality
1
n − 1
∑
j ∈N +
λj ≤ |N
+ |
n − 1 ≤
1
n
(1 + |N + |).
proves PART. And both inequalities are equalities if and only if each λj = 1 and
|N + | = n − 1⇔ N + = N⧹i; the latter implies that i’s utility is already 1 inM (−i ).
Example (3.1) above shows that both RP and CUT are inefficient. Under the CUT
rule agents 1, 2 and 5 load only d , while agent 3 spreads his load between a and b, and
agent 4 between a and c , resulting in the mixture zcut = ( 15 ,
1
10 ,
1
10 ,
3
5 , 0). Under RP we
get zrp = ( 15 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
7
15 , 0); for instance b is selected in two cases only: if 3 is first, and 5
comes before 4 (probability 110 ), or 5 is first and 3 is first among 1, 2, 3 (probability
1
15 ).
As noted at the end of Section 3, shifting the weight of b and c to a and d is a Pareto
improvement. Clearly, then, zrp is more inefficient than zcut .
In our next example, with n = 6 and |A| = 5,
N ↓ A→ a b c d e
1 1 0 0 1 0
2 1 0 0 0 1
3 0 1 0 1 0
4 0 1 0 0 1
5 0 0 1 1 0
6 0 0 1 0 1
(4)
the CUT rule selects the efficient mixture zcut = (0, 0, 0, 12 ,
1
2 ) andU
cut
i = 0.5 for all i ,
while RP picks zrp = ( 19 ,
1
9 ,
1
9 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) andU
rp
i = 0.44 for all i: thus zcut is strictly Pareto
superior to zrp . The reverse situation cannot happen: the RP mixture never Pareto
dominates the CUT one. This follows because in all problems, total utility under RP is
at most that under CUT: U rpN ≤ U cutN . Indeed U cut is the uniform average of profiles
U (i ) maximizing total utility in Φp (M ; i ), and for each ordering σ where i is first, the
corresponding profileU σ is in Φp (M ; i ) as well.4
We finally prove that the CUT rule is efficient more often than RP : whenever RP picks
an efficient mixture, so does CUT. Observe first that both rules only give weight to
undominated pure outcomes. In the case of RP every such outcome a has a positive
weight, because it is selected whenever the set of agents who like a has the highest
priority. Thus the support of the RP mixture is exactly the set of all undominated
columns. Therefore RP selects an efficient mixture if and only if all mixtures with
support in this set are efficient as well. The claim follows because the CUT rule is also
a combination of undominated columns.
The next theorem reinforces the advantage of CUT over RP in terms of efficiency.
Theorem 2
i ) Both rules CUT and RP are strategyproof and meet Strict Participation and Unanimity
Fair Share.
ii ) Total utility at the CUT mixture is never below that at the RP mixture, and the former
may Pareto dominate the latter. If RP picks an efficient mixture at some problem M , so
does CUT.
iii ) The CUT rule is (1 − εcut (n))-inefficient with εcut (n) = O (n− 13 ) and for all n ≥ 5
we have
εcut (n) ≥ 1
n
+ (1 − 1
n
1
3
)
3
n
1
3
. (5)
The RP rule is (1 − εrp (n))-inefficient with εrp (n) ≤ O ( ln(n)n ).
4A consequence of this remark is that CUT and RP pick the same utility profile at problem M if and only if
all undominated outcomes of M are liked by the same number of agents.
Recall from the Lemma in Section 3 that both CUT and RP are efficient if n ≤ 4. For
small values of n, the lower bound (5) implies a high guaranteed efficiency of CUT,
a lower bound on εcut (n), and the computations in Step 2 of the proof below yield a
much smaller worst case efficiency of RP, an upper bound on εrp (n):
n 6 8 12 32 64 1024 16384
εcut ≥ 91% 87% 82% 68% 58% 27% 11%
εrp ≤ 83% 72% 64% 40% 24% 3% 0.12%
Statements ii ) and iii ) make a very strong case that in our model the CUT rule is a
much more efficient interpretation of the random dictator idea than RP.
7 EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS; THE NASH MAX PRODUCT RULE
Our last rule of interest is a familiar compromise between the Utilitarian and Egalitarian
rules:
Nash Max Product rule (NMP): Fnsh (M ) = arg max
U ∈Φ(M )
∑
i ∈N
lnUi .
This rule is well defined because it solves a strictly convex program, and obviously
efficient.
Recall that Unanimity Fair Share offers welfare guarantees only to coalitions of agents
with identical preferences (clones). The first of our two new “Fair Share” axioms applies,
much more generally, to any group who can find at least one outcome that everyone
likes:
Average Fair Share (AFS)
for all S ⊆ N : {∃a ∈ A : uia = 1 for all i ∈ S } =⇒ 1|S |US ≥
|S |
n
.
Therefore AFS is easily seen as a strengthening of IFS whereby a principle applied to
individuals is applied to groups. The next property conveys the idea that, as each agent
is endowed with 1/n-th of total decision power, any coalition of size s can cumulate
these shares and impose that a mixture of their choice be chosen with probability at
least sn :
Core Fair Share (CFS)
for all S ⊆ N : ∄z ∈ ∆(A) s.t. ∀i ∈ S, Ui ≤ |S |
n
(ui · z) and ∃i,Ui < |S |
n
(ui · z).
This is a familiar core stability property which is widely used in cooperative game
theory [21]. They are logically not related. That UFS follows from either AFS or CFS is
clear because we only consider anonymous rules. Applying CFS to S = N implies that
the rule is efficient, therefore neither the CUT or the RP rule meets CFS. In Example
3.1, the AFS property selects uniquely the Nash mixture,5 therefore CUT and RP fail
AFS as well.
Theorem 3
i ) The NMP rule is efficient and meets Strict Participation, Average Fair Share, and Core
Fair Share.
ii ) The NMP rule is not Excludable Strategyproof.
5We leave the proof to the reader and give a similar example in the next paragraph.
Proof
We first prove AFS and CFS. The separation inequality capturing the optimality of the
Nash utility profileU ∗ = Fnsh (M ) at problemM writes as follows:∑
i ∈N
Ui
U ∗i
≤
∑
i ∈N
U ∗i
U ∗i
= n for allU ∈ Φ(M ) (6)
Fix S ⊆ N and combine (6) with Cauchy’s inequality as follows
nU ∗S ≥ (
∑
i ∈S
Ui
U ∗i
).(
∑
i ∈S
U ∗i )≥(
∑
i ∈S
√
Ui )
2 =⇒
U ∗S ≥
1
n
max
U ∈Φ(M )
(
∑
i ∈S
√
Ui )
2 (7)
The AFS property follows, because if there is some a ∈ A such that uia = 1 for all
i ∈ S , the maximum on the right hand side is |S |2. To check CFS we assume there is a
mixture z such thatU ∗i ≤ |S |n (ui · z) for all i ∈ S and use again (6) to compute:
n ≥
∑
i ∈S
ui · z
U ∗i
≥ n|S |
∑
i ∈S
U ∗i
U ∗i
= n
therefore none of the inequalitiesU ∗i ≤ |S |n (ui · z) can be strict.
The proof that NMP satisfies PART∗ is more technical and is relegated to the appendix.
The proof that the NMP rule fails EXSP is also relegated to the appendix. There we
construct an example with |A| = 4 and n = 860 where it violates the SP+ property.
We also report a computer generated example with n =36 agents proving the same
point. □
Remark 3. LetU nashN be the total utility for the Nash allocations andU
∗
N be themaximal
achievable utility (utilitarian welfare). Then it can be proved that U
nash
N
U ∗N
≥ 1nU ∗N .So if
the average utilitarian utility is λ ∈ [0, 1], then average utility of the Nash solution is
at least λ2.
Remark 4. Another version of the group fair share requirement is proposed by Bogo-
molnaia et al. [14]. The same concept was independently proposed by Duddy [22] who
referred to simply as proportional share [22]. For the sake of consistency with our other
notions, we will refer to it as Group Fair Share (GFS). Writing u∗S for the maximum of
all utility functions in S (u∗Sa = maxi ∈S uia ), this condition requiresU ∗S ≥ |S |n for all S .
It is clearly stronger than UFS, but strictly weaker than CFS. Both CUT and RP satisfy
GFS.
Remark 5. It has been mentioned as an open problem, in the more general voting
model with vNM-preferences, whether there exists some rule that satisfies ‘Very
Strong Stochastic Dominance Participation’ and ‘Stochastic Dominance Efficiency’ for
weak orders [16, 18]. Because NMP satisfies both Strict Participation and Efficiency,
we see that this question is resolved at least for the case of dichotomous preferences.
8 EXPERIMENTS
We ran experiments for small numbers of agents and outcomes. We focussed on the
ratio of utilitarian welfare of the result to the maximum utilitarian welfare. The ratio
gives a lower bound on ε as used to define the inefficiency of a mixture. For each
combination of n and |A| in {3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20} and for each rule, we examined under
the impartial culture (1) the minimum of this ratio and (2) its average. For RP, we did
not run the experiments for n = 15 and 20 because the computation becomes very
slow. This illustrates the relative computational infeasibility of RP when we want the
exact mixture, even for a relatively modest number of agents.
As the number of agents increase, the ratios start to get worse. But for a fixed
number of agents, the ratios do not necessarily get worse as we increase the number
of alternatives. We note that CUT seems to fare marginally but consistently better
than NMP, RP, and EGAL in the utilitarian metric. This is especially so when we
consider the average rather than the worst ratios. We note that NMP rule’s fairness
constraints also lead to loss of utilitarian welfare. On the other hand, it has been
shown that on certain real-world participatory budgeting datasets, core fair outcomes
often coincide with welfare maximizing ones [23]. Since the objective of EGAL is
diametrically opposed to utilitarian objectives, it is not surprising that EGAL fares
the worst in the utilitarian metric among the rules we consider. In particular its worst
case ratios drop rapidly as we increase the number of agents and outcomes.
Since CUT performs better than the other competing rules in terms of welfare, we
zoomed into the case of CUT and computed its average and worse case inefficiency
n in {5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50} and |A| in {5, 610, 1530, 40, 50, 60} where agents approve a
given percentage of outcomes where the percentages are 10, 25, 33, 50, 75. For each of
the combinations of parameters, 200000 draws are taken. The level of inefficiency is
negligible for all the combinations.
9 DECENTRALIZATION
We also introduce a Decentralization (DEC) property for polarized societies. Say the
agents and the deterministic outcomes are color-coded with the same set of colors:
we call a profile of preferences polarized if each agent only likes outcomes of his own
color. The requirement is that if I am red, the number of green agents will matter
to me but not their preferences inside green outcomes. This natural independence
property adds to the appeal of the NMP rule, but also of the CUT and RP rules.
Consider a problemM = (N ,A,u) and two partitions Γ = (N k )Kk=1 and Λ = (A
k )Kk=1
of N and A respectively. We call this problem polarized along the partitions Γ,Λ if
uia = 0 whenever i ∈ N k ,a ∈ Ak ′ , and k , k ′. Then if uk is the restriction of u to
N k ×Ak , problem M is captured by its K subproblems Mk = (N k ,Ak ,uk ). We write
Π(Γ,Λ) the set of polarized problems.
Decentralization (DEC): For allM,M ′, for all u,u ′, and for any Γ,Λ and k
{M,M ′ ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) and uia = u ′ia if i ∈ N k ,a ∈ Ak } =⇒ Fi (M ) = Fi (M ′) for i ∈ N k .
Decentralization can be viewed as satisfying an extension of party-list proportional
representation from multi-winner voting [24]. Combined with the UFS property, it
implies that in a polarized problem, each colored subset N k chooses the distribution
in ∆(Ak ) as if other colors were not present, then the selected outcome in f (Mk ) is
weighted down in proportion of the size of N k .
Theorem 4 The Nash, Conditional Utilitarian, and Random Priority rules meet Decen-
tralization. Moreover for any polarized problem M ∈ Π(Γ,Λ) they satisfy
F (M ) =
K∑
k=1
|N k |
n
F (Mk ) (8)
where the profile F (Mk ) is filled with zeros outside Mk .
On the other hand, the Utilitarian and Egalitarian rules violate DEC. Consider the
two polarized problems along the partition {1} ∪ (2, 3}:
M :
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
M ′ :
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 1 1
.
Both UTIL and EGAL choose z = ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ) at M , but at M
′ they pick respectively
z ′ = (0, 1, 0) and z ′′ = ( 12 ,
1
2 , 0), in contradiction of DEC.
10 CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We compared the relative merits of some well-known rules (EGAL, RP, NMP) and of
an (essentially) new one (CUT), for the model of probabilistic/fractional voting under
dichotomous preferences. The two rules that are especially desirable in the instances
where protection of minorities and participation concerns matter most are CUT and
NMP. The Conditional Utilitarian rule is strongly incentive compatible, but in extreme
cases it may be severely inefficient. The Nash Max Product rule is efficient and gives
much better guarantees to groups of agents than CUT, but it even fails the weak form
of strategyproofness where outcomes are excludable.
We make a few remarks about the computational aspects of the rules. The CUT rule
is the easiest to compute of the four. In the like-set of each agent we simply need to
identify those liked by the largest number of other agents. For EGAL, the outcome can
be computed in polynomial-time by solving at most n + 1 linear programs each with
|A| variables [7]. The RP outcome is #P-complete to compute even under dichotomous
preferences [5]. Therefore unless P=NP, it is unlikely that there exists an efficient
algorithm for computing the exact RP outcome. For RP, it is even open whether there
exists an FPRAS (Fully Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme) for computing the
outcome shares/probabilities. As for NMP, in contrast to RP, an approximate solution
can be computed relatively fast by using general optimisation packages and solvers.
The problem is to maximize a convex objective ∑i ∈N log(ui · z) where z is a feasible
mixture [15].
Our study helps identify two especially interesting open questions. We know from
[15] that Efficiency, Individual Fair Share and Strategyproofness are incompatible.
If we are content to achieve only the excludable version of Strategyproofness, this
incompatibility disappears, and the Egalitarian rule is an example. The unpalatable
feature of this rule is that it pays no attention to clones (subgroups of agents with
identical preferences) hence offers no protection to sizable minorities. But can a rule
combine Efficiency, Excludable Strategyproofness and Strict Participation; or Efficiency,
Excludable Strategyproofness and Unanimous Fair Share? Such a rule would be a
serious new contender in our fair mixing model.
Bogomolnaia et al. [14, 15] defined and studied a family of welfarist rules directly
borrowed from classical social choice theory. Fix an increasing, strictly concave, and
continuous function h on [0, 1]. A rule in the sense of Definition 1 is obtained by max-
imizing the sum of individual utilities weighted by h: h-rule: f (M ) = argmaxU ∈Φ(M )∑
i ∈N h(Ui ). This maximization has a unique solution in Φ(M ). The NMP rule is of
course a paramount example. All h-rules are efficient, and by mimicking Step 2 in the
proof of Theorem 3, we see that they satisfy PART∗ provided h′(0) = ∞. They satisfy
(resp. fail) IFS if h is at least as concave as (resp. less concave than) the loд function;
but NMP is the only h-rule meeting UFS (these two facts are already proven in [14]).
Finally all h-rules fail EXSP and only NMP meets DEC. Thus they don’t add much to
our axiomatic discussion. However, once we observe that the EGAL and UTIL rules
are the two end points of the family of h-rules6 the following intriguing fact emerges:
most h-rules meet PART∗ but neither EGAL nor UTIL does; EGAL and UTIL meet
EXSP, but none of the h-rules does.
11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Haris Aziz is supported by a UNSW Scientia Fellowship. The authors thank Edward
Lee and Yekaterina Rzhewskaya for assistance with the experiments. The comments
of seminar participants at Seoul National University, Université Paris 1, University
Technology Sydney, and the Paris School of Economics are gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Abdulkadiroğlu and T. Sönmez. 1998. Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random
Endowments in House Allocation Problems. Econometrica 66, 3 (1998), 689–701.
[2] H. Aziz. 2013. Maximal Recursive Rule: A New Social Decision Scheme. In Proc. of 23rd IJCAI. AAAI
Press, 34–40.
[3] H. Aziz. 2019. A Probabilistic Approach to Voting, Allocation, Matching, and Coalition Formation. In
The Future of Economic Design, J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. S. Zwicker (Eds.). Springer.
[4] H. Aziz, F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. 2018. On the Tradeoff between Efficiency and Strategyproof-
ness. Games and Economic Behavior 110 (2018), 1–18.
[5] H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill. 2013. The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship.
Economics Letters 121, 3 (2013), 341–345.
[6] H. Aziz, M. Brill, V. Conitzer, E. Elkind, R. Freeman, and T. Walsh. 2017. Justified Representation in
Approval-Based Committee Voting. Social Choice and Welfare 48, 2 (2017), 461–485.
[7] H. Aziz and P. Stursberg. 2014. A Generalization of Probabilistic Serial to Randomized Social Choice.
In Proc. of 28th AAAI Conference. AAAI Press, 559–565.
[8] J. Behrens. 2017. The origins of liquid democracy. The Liquid Democracy Journal 5 (2017).
[9] G. Benade, S. Nath, A. D. Procaccia, and N. Shah. 2017. Preference Elicitation For Participatory
Budgeting. In Proc. of 31st AAAI Conference. AAAI Press, 376–382.
[10] A. Bogomolnaia. 2018. The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules. Journal of Public
Economic Theory 20, 2 (2018), 271–276.
[11] A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. 2001. A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem. Journal of
Economic Theory 100, 2 (2001), 295–328.
[12] A. Bogomolnaia and H.Moulin. 2004. RandomMatching under Dichotomous Preferences. Econometrica
72, 1 (2004), 257–279.
6When h converges pointwise to a linear function, e.g. h (x ) = xq with q ↑ 1, the h-rule converges
pointwise to UTIL; when h becomes infinitely concave, e.g. h (x ) = −xq with q ↓ −∞, it converges
pointwise to EGAL.
[13] A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskyi, and E. Yanovskaya. 2017. Competitive division of a
mixed manna. Econometrica 85, 6 (2017), 1847–1871.
[14] A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, and R. Stong. 2002. Collective choice under dichotomous preferences.
(2002).
[15] A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, and R. Stong. 2005. Collective choice under dichotomous preferences.
Journal of Economic Theory 122, 2 (2005), 165–184.
[16] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and J. Hofbauer. 2015. Incentives for Participation and Abstention in Probabilistic
Social Choice. In Proc. of 14th AAMAS Conference. IFAAMAS, 1411–1419.
[17] F. Brandl, F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig. 2016. Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice. Econometrica 84, 5
(2016), 1839–1880.
[18] F. Brandt. 2017. Rolling the Dice: Recent Results in Probabilistic Social Choice. In Trends in Computa-
tional Social Choice, U. Endriss (Ed.). AI Access, Chapter 1, 3–26.
[19] Y. Cabannes. 2004. Participatory budgeting: a significant contribution to participatory democracy.
Environment and Urbanization 16, 1 (2004), 27–46.
[20] I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, and J. Wang. 2016. The Unreasonable
Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare. In Proc. of 17th ACM-EC Conference. 305–322.
[21] T. Driessen. 1988. Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications. Kluwer.
[22] C. Duddy. 2015. Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences 73 (2015),
1–5.
[23] B. Fain, A. Goel, and K. Munagala. 2016. The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem. InWeb
and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December 11-14,
2016, Proceedings. 384–399.
[24] P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, and N. Talmon. 2017. Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for
Social Choice Theory. In Trends in Computational Social Choice, U. Endriss (Ed.). Chapter 2.
[25] P. C. Fishburn. 1984. Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons. Review of
Economic Studies 51, 4 (1984), 683–692.
[26] P. C. Fishburn and S. J. Brams. 1983. Paradoxes of Preferential Voting. Mathematics Magazine 56, 4
(1983), 207–214.
[27] A. Gibbard. 1977. Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica 45, 3 (1977),
665–681.
[28] J. Gordon. 1994. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting. Columbia
Law Review 94, 1 (1994), 124–192.
[29] U. Grandi. 2017. Agent-Mediated Social Choice. In The Future of Economic Design, J.F. Laslier, H. Moulin,
R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker (Eds.). Springer.
[30] J. Hughes and G. Sasse. 2003. Monitoring the monitors : EU enlargement conditionality and minority
protection in the CEECs. Journal on ethnopolitics and minority issues in Europe 1 (2003), 35.
[31] G. Laffond, J.-F. Laslier, and M. Le Breton. 1993. The Bipartisan Set of a Tournament Game. Games
and Economic Behavior 5, 1 (1993), 182–201.
[32] H. Moulin. 1981. The Proportional Veto Principle. Review of Economic Studies 48, 3 (1981).
[33] H. Moulin. 1982. Voting with Proportional Veto Power. Econometrica 50, 1 (1982), 145–162.
[34] H. Moulin. 1988. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press.
[35] H. Moulin. 2003. Fair Division and Collective Welfare. The MIT Press.
[36] H. Moulin. 2019. Fair Division in the Internet Age. Annual Review of Economics 11 (2019), 1–37.
[37] J. F. Nash. 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18, 2 (1950), 155–162.
[38] R. La Porta, F. Lopez de Silanes, A. Schleifer, and R. Vishny. 2000. Investor protection and corporate
governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 1–2 (2000), 3–27.
[39] J. Sawyer and D. MacRae. 1962. Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954. The
American Political Science Review 56, 4 (1962), 936–946.
[40] H. Steinhaus. 1948. The problem of fair division. Econometrica 16 (1948), 101–104.
[41] W. Thomson. 2016. Introduction to the Theory of Fair Allocation. In Handbook of Computational Social
Choice, F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia (Eds.). Cambridge University
Press, Chapter 11.
[42] H. R. Varian. 1974. Equity, Envy, and Efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 9 (1974), 63–91.
[43] G. Young. 1950. The case for cumulative voting. Wisconsin Law Review 49–56 (1950).
12 APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1 part ii)
Proof. Fix a problemM as in statement ii ). If some outcomes are “clones” (liked by
exactly the same set of agents), a class of clones is an interval as well and it is clearly
enough to prove the statement for the “decloned” problem where each interval of
clones has shrunk to a single outcome. Thus we can assume that our problem has no
clones.
Let A∗ denote the subset of undominated pure outcomes. We fix a mixture z with
support in A∗ (z ∈ ∆(A∗)) and assume some other mixture y ∈ ∆(A∗) makes everyone
weakly better off than z: we will show y = z, which implies the statement.
We keep in mind that for any two a,b in A∗ there is some agent i who likes a but not
b, because a and b are not clones. Write the ordered set A∗as {1, · · · ,K } and apply this
remark to the first two agents: some agent i likes 1 but not 2, hence i likes only 1 and
ui · z ≤ ui · y implies z1 ≤ y1. Some agent j likes 2 but not 3, hence j likes 1, 2 or just
2, so uj · z ≤ uj · y is either z12 ≤ y12 or z2 ≤ y2 and either way we deduce z12 ≤ y12.
Similarly there is some k who likes 3 but not 4, so uk · z ≤ uk · y means that at least
one of z3, z23, and z123 increases weakly and inequality z123 ≤ y123 follows in each
case. An obvious induction argument gives
z12· · ·k ≤ y12· · ·k for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
The symmetric argument starting from outcome K gives
zk (k+1) · · ·K ≤ yk (k+1) · · ·K for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K
and the desired conclusion y = z follows. □
Proof of Theorem 2 part i): CUT satisfies SP
Proof. Consider an agent i who has a like set Li = L0i ∪ L−i where L−i is possibly
empty. Suppose she now reports her like set as L′i = L0i ∪ L+i where L+i ⊆ A \ Li . Agent
i’s own contribution of 1/n to Li can only decrease if she report L′i . We now focus on
the effect of i reporting L′i on to any other agent j , i . Note that j’s contribution to Li
either remains the same or decreases. Therefore agent i gets no benefit by reporting
L′i . □
Proof of Theorem 2, part iii )
Step 1 Worst case inefficiency of CUT
Step 1.a: We construct a problem with large n where the CUT profile is (1 −O (n− 13 )-
inefficient. We fix N of size n, a partition N = N1 ∪ N2, and an integer p such that
p < n1,n2 and n1 divides (p − 1)n2 where ni = |Ni |, i = 1, 2.
ProblemM has 2n2 + 1 outcomes labeled as A = {a} ∪ B ∪C , where B = {bj , j ∈ N2}
and C = {c j , j ∈ N2}. Setting (p − 1)n2 = qn1, each agent i ∈ N1 likes a, exactly q
outcomes in B, and none in C; and each j ∈ N2 dislikes a, likes only outcome bj in B,
and exactly p − 1 outcomes in C . Moreover the problem is symmetric in N1 and in N2,
which can be achieved by arranging cyclically the like-sets of the N1 agents in B and
the like-sets of the N2 agents in C . Here is an example with n1 = n2 = 5,p = 4 and
q = 3, and the top five agents form N1:
a b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
Note that each outcome bj is liked by exactly p agents, all but one of them in N1, and
each c j is liked by exactly p − 1 agents, all in N2.
Under the CUT rule, each agent i ∈ N1 loads only a because n1 > p, so za = n1n , and
each j ∈ N2 loads only bj so zbj = 1n ; there is no weight on C . Total utility in each
group is
UN1 =
(n1)
2
n
+
n2
n
(p − 1) ;UN2 =
n2
n
and by the symmetries these are equally shared in N1 and N2 respectively.
Now consider the mixture z ′: z ′a = 23 , z
′
c j =
1
3n2 for all j ∈ N2, and zero weight on B,
resulting in the total utilities
U ′N1 =
2
3n1 ;U
′
N2 =
1
3 (p − 1)
again equally shared in each Ni .
For n large enough we can pick n1 and p such that n1 ≃ n 23 and p − 1 ≃ n 13 (if n is a
cube these values are exact and q = n 23 − n 13 ) so that n2n ≃ 1. This yields the ratios
U ′N1
UN1
≃
2
3n
2
3
2n 13
=
1
3n
1
3 =
U ′N2
UN2
and completes the proof of Step 1.a.
Step 1.b. For an arbitrary problem M we give a upper-bound of the inefficiency of the
CUT mixture.
Wefix a problemM and partition the agents according to their scoresmaxU ∈Φp (M ;i ) UN ,
i.e., the utilitarian score of the outcomes on which they spread their weight under
the CUT rule. Let p1 > p2 > · · · > pK > 0 be the sequence of such scores and Nk the
subset of agents who load outcomes with score pk . Note that n1 ≥ p1. Set Ak to be the
set of outcomes loaded by at least one agent in Nk : they all have the same score pk so
the Ak -s are pairwise disjoint. Note also that agents in Nk do not like any outcome in
Aℓ for ℓ < k .
Consider finally the outcomes b in B = A⧹(∪K1 Ak ), if any. Their utilitarian score
uNb is at most p1 − 1. We partition B by gathering in Bk all the outcomes with a score
in [pk+1,pk ], with the convention pK+1 = 0. Therefore the agents in Nk do not like
any outcome in Bℓ for ℓ < k .
We prove first that for any feasible profile U ∈ Φ(M ), we can find convex weights
π1, · · · ,πK such that
UNk ≤ πkpk for k = 1, · · · ,K (9)
Pick z ∈ ∆(A) implementing U and write for simplicity zAk = xk and zBk = yk . The
total contribution7 UNAk = xkpk of Ak to UN is shared between the agents of ∪k1Nℓ
only, so there are some convex weights γ k
ℓ
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
UNℓAk = γ
k
ℓ xkpk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K .
Similarly the contributionUNBk of Bk is shared in ∪k1Nℓ andUNBk ≤ ykpk . So we can
find convex weights δk
ℓ
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
UNℓBk ≤ δkℓykpk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K .
Combining the above equality and inequality we have for all k
UNk =
K∑
ℓ=k
(UNkAℓ +UNkBℓ ) ≤
K∑
ℓ=k
(γ ℓkxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ )pℓ ≤ pk
K∑
ℓ=k
(γ ℓkxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ )
so the weights πk =
∑K
ℓ=k (γ
ℓ
kxℓ + δ
ℓ
kyℓ ) are indeed convex and satisfy (9).
Next we evaluate the blocks of the profileU cut in the same fashion. Agents in Nk load
exclusively Ak therefore if z implement U cut we have zAk =
nk
n and U
cut
NAk
=
nk
n pk .
We can find as above convex weights θk
ℓ
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k, such that
U cutNℓAk = θ
k
ℓ
nk
n
pk for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k ≤ K
and then as above we get
U cutNk =
K∑
ℓ=k
θ ℓk
nℓ
n
pℓ .
Assume now the profile U cut is (1 − ε )-inefficient: U cut ≤ εU for some feasible U .
From (9) we find convex weights π such thatU cutNk ≤ επkpk for all k , which implies
ε ≥
K∑
k=1
1
pk
U cutNk =
K∑
ℓ=1
nℓ
n
ℓ∑
k=1
θ ℓk
pℓ
pk
.
The key inequality isU cutNkAk ≥
nk
n because agent i ∈ Nk loads only Ak containing his
like-set: this implies θkk ≥ 1pk . Moreover in the sum
∑ℓ
k=1 θ
ℓ
k
pℓ
pk
the terms pℓpk increase
in k . Combining these two observations we have for any ℓ ≥ 2:
ℓ∑
k=1
θ ℓk
pℓ
pk
≥ (
ℓ−1∑
k=1
θ ℓk )
pℓ
p1
+ θ ℓℓ ≥ (1 −
1
pℓ
)
pℓ
p1
+
1
pℓ
=
pℓ − 1
p1
+
1
pℓ
.
We invoke now the inequality α−1p1 +
1
α ≥ 2√p1 − 1p1 , for any α > 0, that we apply to
each α = pℓ, ℓ ≥ 2, and combine with the two inequalities above as well as θ 11 = 1:
ε ≥ n1
n
+ (1 − n1
n
) (
2√
p1
− 1
p1
).
7Recall our notation uSB =
∑
i∈S
∑
a∈B uia .
Finally the term 2√p1 − 1p1 decreases in p1 and we know p1 ≤ n1, so we get
ε ≥ 1
n
(n1 + (n − n1) ( 2√
n1
− 1
n1
)).
It remains to compute the minimum of the above expression for fixed n and variable
n1 ∈ [1,n]. With the real variable x instead of n1 the right hand term and its derivative
are
φ (x ) =
1
n
(1 + x − 2√x ) + ( 2√
x
− 1
x
) =⇒ φ ′(x ) = (1 − 1√
x
) (
1
n
− 1
x
3
2
).
therefore x = n 23 achieves the minimum and we compute
ε ≥ φ (n 23 ) = 1
n
+ (1 − 1
n
1
3
)
3
n
1
3
.
which is inequality (5).
Step 2: Lower bounding the worst case inefficiency of RP
Fix N and integers k,d, ℓ such that n = kd and 2 ≤ ℓ < k . Fix a partition N 1∪· · ·∪N d
of N where each subset contains k agents. This construction requires n ≥ 6 and is not
feasible for all n.
We consider the problem with A = D ∪C where D = {1, · · · ,d } and each δ ∈ D is
liked exactly by the k agents in N δ ; also |C | =
(
n
ℓ
)
and each outcome in C is liked
exactly by a different subset of ℓ agents.
The symmetric (egalitarian) and efficient outcome is the uniform distribution in D
and yields the utility profileU ∗i =
1
d for all i . We compute now the symmetric profile
U implemented by RP.
Fix an ordering σ ∈ Θ(N ) and let L be the set of its ℓ highest priority agents. In the
resulting profile U σ , the first ℓ agents have full utility (because there is a ∈ C where
they all do). Two cases arise. In the favourable case L is contained in some set N δ : then
δ is the only efficient pure outcome liked by all agents in L, thus it must be chosen
by the σ -priority rule andU σN = k . In the unfavourable case L straddles two or more
sets N δ and there is only one outcome (in C) that everyone in L like, so thatU σN = ℓ.
Therefore
UN =
d
(
k
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ
) · k + (1 − d (kℓ)(
n
ℓ
) k ) · ℓ = (k − ℓ)n
k
(
k
ℓ
)(
n
ℓ
) + ℓ.
=⇒ ε (n) ≤ UN
U ∗N
= (1 − ℓ
k
)
(k − 1) · · · (k − ℓ + 1)
(n − 1) · · · (n − ℓ + 1) +
ℓ
k
(10)
For the asymptotic statement we use the inequality (
k
ℓ)
(nℓ )
≤ ( kn )ℓ and compute
⇒ Ui
U ′i
=
UN
U ′N
≤ (k
n
)ℓ−1 +
ℓ
k
.
Then we choose k ≃ ne and ℓ ≃ ln(n) so that ( kn )ℓ−1 + ℓk ≃ e ln(n)n . The systematic
inequality εrp (n) ≤ 6 ln(n)n is obtained by numerical estimations of (10), omitted for
brevity.■
Remark 2 The proof of Step 2 improves upon, with a similar proof technique, Example 1
in [14] establishing that RP is (1 − 2√n )-inefficient.
Proof of Theorem 3 i ): NMP satisfies PART∗
In a preliminary result we fix S ⊂ RN+ convex and compact, and write S (−1) for its
projection on RN⧹1+ . Define
U ∗ = argmax
U ∈S
∑
i ∈N
ln(Ui )
U −1 = arg max
U−1∈S (−1)
∑
i ∈N⧹1
ln(Ui ) andU 1 = max
(U1,U −1 )∈S
U1.
InequalityU ∗1 < U 1 brings a contradiction as follows∑
i ∈N
ln(U i ) ≥ ln(U 1) +
∑
i ∈N⧹{1}
ln(U ∗i ) >
∑
i ∈N
ln(U ∗i ).
Assume nextU ∗1 = U 1. The right hand inequality above becomes an equality, so we get∑
i ∈N ln(U i ) =
∑
i ∈N ln(U ∗i ) and finallyU = U ∗. Summing up, we have just proven:
U ∗1 ≥ U 1; and if U ∗1 = U 1 then U ∗−1 = U −1 (11)
Applying (11) to S = Φ(M ), U ∗ = Fnsh (M ), U −1 = Fnsh (M (−1)) gives U 1 = U1 (−1)
andU ∗1 ≥ U 1, the first inequality in PART∗ (i.e., PART). To check the second we can
assume that any two columns of u are different, for if two columns are identical one
of them can be eliminated as a redundant outcome. Also recall that no row of u is null.
Because U ∗i > 0 for all i , the statement is true if U 1 = 0. We assume now 0 < U ∗1 =
U 1 < 1 and derive a contradiction. Property (11) implies U ∗ = U , therefore there is
some z ∈ ∆(A) solving both problems: z ∈ f nsh (M ) ∩ f nsh (M ( − 1)).
As 0 < U ∗1 < 1 the mixture z cannot be deterministic, moreover there exists two
outcomes a,b in the support [z] of z such that u1a = 1,u1b = 0. Writing N (x ;y) for
the set of agents in N who like x and dislike y, this means 1 ∈ N (a;b).
Note that N (b;a) must contain at least one i ∈ N⧹1: otherwise the columnUa domi-
nates columnUb (outcome b is Pareto inferior to a) which contradicts the efficiency of
z inM . We claim that N (a;b) as well contains some j ∈ N⧹1: suppose not, then the
restriction of column Ub to N⧹1 either dominates the corresponding restriction of
Ua , or these two restricted columns are equal; the former case contradicts efficiency
of z inM (−1), the latter contradicts its efficiency inM .
We have shown that N (a;b) and N (b;a) both contains at least one outcome in N⧹1.
Recalling that za , zb are both positive, we define z (ε ) by shifting the weight ε from
a to b: this outcome is well defined for ε small enough and of arbitrary sign; such a
shift does not affect agents outside N (a;b) ∪ N (b;a). From z ∈ f nsh (M ( − 1)) we see
that the strictly concave functionφ (ε ) = ∑i ∈(N (a;b )∪N (b ;a))⧹1 ln(ui · z (ε )).reaches its
maximum at ε = 0. And z ∈ f nsh (M ) implies that the function φ (ε ) + ln(u1 · z (ε )) is
also maximal at ε = 0: this is a contradiction because ln(u1 · z (ε )) decreases strictly in
ε .■
Proof of Theorem 3 ii ): The NMP rule fails EXSP
A numerical example. Consider the following example with 36 agents and 4 outcomes.
a b c d
No. of agents types
4 1 0 0 0
4 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
2 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0 1
7 1 0 1 0
7 1 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0
4 0 1 0 1
The outcome of NMP is (0.4163514575435199, 0.08787730532715962, 0.2479123840667547,
0.24785885306256383). If one agent of type one additionally liked b, the profile is as
follows.
a b c d
No. of agents types
3 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
4 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 1
2 1 1 1 0
2 1 1 0 1
7 1 0 1 0
7 1 0 0 1
4 0 1 1 0
4 0 1 0 1
In this case, the outcome of NMP is 0.4179621510380684,
0.1389580435629242, 0.22150747720884034, 0.22157232819017458). Note that the
misreporting agent gets more utility (equivalently more probability for outcome a by
additionally liking b).
A formal construction. We fix N and A and describe a profile u ∈ Ω by the vector
(nS )S ∈2A⧹∅ of non negative integers, where nS is the number of agents i with like-set
Li = S . Because f nsh is Anonymous, this is all we need to describe f nsh (u). If z ∈ ∆(A)
has full support (za > 0 for all a), it is (uniquely) selected atu if and only if the gradient
of z → φ (z) = ∑N ln(zLi ) is parallel at z to 1A. Write Θ(a) for the set of subsets of A
containing a, then we have
∂φ
∂za
(z) =
∑
i :a∈Li
1
zLi
=
∑
S ∈Θ(a)
nS
zS
so if Θ(a − b) is the set of coalitions containing a and not b, and Sc is A⧹S , we have
∂φ
∂za
(z) =
∂φ
∂zb
(z) ⇐⇒
∑
S ∈Θ(a−b )
(
nS
zS
− nSc
zSc
) = 0 (12)
Thus f nsh (u) = z holds iff the right hand equation above holds for |A| −1 independent
pairs a,b.
Constructing an example violating SP+. We note first that SP+ is equivalent to the
following property: if at profile u a set of K agents have identical preferences S , and
u ′ is obtained from u when they all report instead S ∪ T , ceteris paribus, then the
total weight of S decreases weakly from u to u ′. Indeed by SP+, when our K agents
misreport their preferences one at a time, the weight of a must decrease weakly at
each step.
We fix now A = {a,b, c1, c2} and two mixtures z, z ′ ∈ ∆(A), both symmetric in c1, c2
and such that
0 < za < z ′a , 0 < zb < z ′b , zc > z
′
c > 0 (13)
(where zc stands for zc1 = zc2 ). We show that, under some additional restrictions on
z, z ′ we can choose u ∈ Ω and an integer K such that f nsh (u) = z and f nsh (u ′) = z ′,
where u ′ is obtained from u when K agents of type a switch to ab. This contradicts
SP+.
The profile u is symmetric in c1, c2 and we write nac in lieu of nac1 etc..Then φ (u) = z
holds iff the two equations (12) applied respectively to a, c1 and to b, c1, are true: note
that (12) for c1, c2 is obtained by the symmetry assumption. These two equations are
(
na
za
− nbcc
zbcc
) + (
nab
zab
− ncc
zcc
) + (
nac2
zac2
− nbc1
zbc1
) + (
nabc2
zabc2
− nc1
zc1
) = 0 (14)
(
nb
zb
− nacc
zacc
) + (
nab
zab
− ncc
zcc
) + (
nbc2
zbc2
− nac1
zac1
) + (
nabc2
zabc2
− nc1
zc1
) = 0 (15)
We choose u in such a way that all parenthesis above are null, that is we pick five
positive parameters α , β ,γ ,δ , ε , such that
na
za
=
nbcc
zbcc
= αK ; nb
zb
=
nacc
zacc
= βK ; nc
zc
=
nabc
zabc
= γK (16)
nab
zab
=
ncc
zcc
= δK ; nac
zac
=
nbc
zbc
= εK (17)
Note that we must have na ≥ K ⇐⇒ α ≥ 1za in order to constructu ′ by transforming
K agents who only like {a} to agents who like a and b. And if the coordinates of z and
the numbers α , · · · , ε are all rational, we can choose K large enough so that the above
system delivers integers nS for all S .
The profile u ′ has n′a = na −K and n′ab = nab +K , and other terms nS are as in u. The
desired equality f nsh (u ′) = z ′ requires two equations like (14) and (15). For instance
(14) becomes
(
na
z ′a
− nbcc
z ′bcc
) + (
nab
z ′ab
− ncc
z ′cc
) + (
nac
z ′ac
− nbc
z ′bc
) + (
nabc
z ′abc
− nc
z ′c
) = K (
1
z ′a
− 1
z ′ab
).
Taking (16), (17) into account this becomes
(
za
z ′a
− zbcc
z ′bcc
)α + (
zab
z ′ab
− zcc
z ′cc
)δ + (
zac
z ′ac
− zbc
z ′bc
)ε + (
zabc
z ′abc
− zc
z ′c
)γ =
1
z ′a
− 1
z ′ab
.
⇐⇒ za − z
′
a
z ′a · (1 − z ′a ) ·α+
zab − z ′ab
z ′ab · (1 − z ′ab )
·δ+ zac − z
′
ac
z ′ac · (1 − z ′ac ) ·ε+
z ′c − zc
z ′c · (1 − z ′c ) ·γ =
z ′b
z ′a · z ′ab
.
Now we use inequalities (13) to check that in the above sum, all numerators except
zac −z ′ac are negative. Therefore zac −z ′ac is positive and we can rewrite this equation
as
zac − z ′ac
z ′ac · (1 − z ′ac ) ·ε =
z ′b
z ′a · z ′ab
+
zc − z ′c
z ′c · (1 − z ′c ) ·γ+
z ′a − za
z ′a · (1 − z ′a ) ·α+
z ′ab − zab
z ′ab · (1 − z ′ab )
·δ (18)
where all fractions are positive on both sides.
The second equation we need to ensure f nsh (u ′) = z ′ is the counterpart of (15) and
reads
(
nb
z ′b
− nacc
z ′acc
) + (
nab
z ′ab
− ncc
z ′cc
) + (
nbc
z ′bc
− nac
z ′ac
) + (
nabc
z ′abc
− nc
z ′c
) +
K
z ′ab
= 0.
A similar computation using (16), (17) to change the terms nS into zS and inequalities
(13) to sign the fractions gives
1
z ′ab
=
z ′b − zb
z ′b · (1 − z ′b )
· β + z
′
ab − zab
z ′ab · (1 − z ′ab )
· δ + zac − z
′
ac
z ′ac · (1 − z ′ac ) · ε +
zc − z ′c
z ′c · (1 − z ′c ) ·γ (19)
where again all ratios are positive.
We must show that the non negative rational numbers α , · · · , ε can be chosen solving
system (18), (19) and α ≥ 1za . Note that (18) implies
zac − z ′ac
z ′ac · (1 − z ′ac ) · ε >
z ′b
z ′a · z ′ab
+
z ′a − za
z ′a · (1 − z ′a ) ·
1
za
and (19) gives
zac − z ′ac
z ′ac · (1 − z ′ac ) · ε <
1
z ′ab
We can choose ε meeting these two inequalities if and only if
z ′b
z ′a · z ′ab
+
z ′a − za
z ′a · (1 − z ′a ) ·
1
za
<
1
z ′ab
⇐⇒ z
′
a − za
za · (1 − z ′a ) <
z ′a − z ′b
z ′ab
⇐⇒ za >
z ′a + z ′b
2 − z ′a + z ′b
. (20)
and in this case we can also pick α ≥ 1za as well as β,γ ,δ solving (18), (19).
Summing up the requirements on z, z ′: we need inequalities (13), (20) as well as
z ′ac < zac ⇐⇒ z ′a − z ′b < za − zb . Note that (20) and z ′a > za together imply z ′a > z ′b .
We can construct such a pair z, z ′ as follows.
Write r the RHS in (20), and check r < z ′a as long as so z ′a > z ′b . Thus it is enough
to pick za in the interval ]max{r , z ′a − z ′b }, z ′a[, and then to pick zb small enough that
z ′a − z ′b < za − zb .
For instance we can choose
za =
9
20 , zb =
1
20 , zc = zc
′ =
1
4 ; z
′
a =
1
2 , z
′
b = z
′
c = z
′
c ′ =
1
6
the system (18), (19) is then
3
20ε =
1
2 +
3
5γ +
3
4δ +
1
5α
3
5γ +
3
20ε +
21
25β +
3
4δ =
3
2
where we recall the constraint na ≥ K ⇔ 920α ≥ 1.
A relatively simple solution of the system above is
α =
25
11 , γ =
5
11 , ε =
90
11 , β = δ = 0
for which we derive the profile u ∈ Ω by system (16), (17). Here K = 44 is the smallest
integer delivering integer coordinates, and we end up with 860 agents and the profile
na = 45, nbcc ′ = 55 ; nc = nc ′ = 5, nabc = nabc ′ = 15 ; nac = nac ′ = 252;
nbc = nbc ′ = 108.
Example where the NMP rule violates (a slightly stronger version of) SP0. We use the
same technique. Set A = {a,a′,a′′,b, c} and construct two profiles u,u ′ such that u is
obtained fromu ′ whenK agents who all like {a,a′,a′′,b} all declare {a,a′,a′′} and end
up better off even though they cannot consume b anymore (so u ′ is the true profile).
This property implies a group version of SP0.
At profile u the K agents in question declare {a,a′,a′′} and φ (u) = z; at u ′ they
switch to {a,a′,a′′,b} (nothing else changes) and φ (u ′) = z ′. The profiles are entirely
symmetric in a,a′,a′′. We define
za =
1
6 , zb =
1
32 , zc =
15
32 ; z
′
a =
1
16 , z
′
b =
1
4 , z
′
c =
9
16
Note that z ′aaab < zaaa as desired but zaab < z
′
aab .
We have six types of preferences and ten homogenous coalitions of which the sizes
meet the analog of system (8), (5) for some positive parameters γ ,δ :
naaa
zaaa
=
nbc
zbc
= K , naaab
zaaab
=
nc
zc
= γK , nac
zac
=
naab
zaab
= δK
(we have three coalitions who like one of the a-s and c , and another three who like two
of the a-s and b). This implies φ (u) = z. To ensure φ (u ′) = z ′ we need two instances of
the first order condition (12), respectively for b, c and for a∗,b where a∗ is an arbitrary
selection from a,a′,a′′; symmetry implies (12) between two a-s.
Straightforward computations as above, omitted for brevity, show that (12) for b,c
reduces to
zaaab − z ′aaab
z ′aaab · z ′c
γK +
16
7 K = 3
zac − z ′ac
z ′ac · z ′aab
δK
and for a∗,b
zaaa − z ′aaa
z ′aaa · z ′bc
K +
za∗c − z ′a∗c
z ′a∗c · z ′aab
δK =
16
3 K
With our choice of z, z ′ these equations boil down to
32
85γ +
16
7 = 3(
2
45δ ) ;
160
39 +
2
45δ =
16
3
=⇒ γ = 34091 , δ =
360
13 .
Finally we pick K = 8 × 19 × 91 = 13832 and get
naaa = nbc = K ; naaab = 17 × 85 × 19 = 27455 ; nc = 15 × 85 × 19 = 24225
naab = 35 × 90 × 56 ≃ 176400,nac = 61 × 90 × 56 ≃ 307440.
Experiments: welfare achieved by the rules
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8314 0.8155 0.8069 0.8005 0.781 0.7149
5 0.7777 0.7778 0.7322 0.7531 0.7072 0.7172
7 0.7678 0.80790 0.7373 0.695 0.7581 0.7109
10 0.7524 0.7334 0.808 0.7843 0.7857 0.7204
15 0.7862 0.8029 0.7561 0.7801 0.7747 0.7737
20 0.792 0.8234 0.7764 0.8155 0.7505 0.7896
Table 2. Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under the NMP rule to maximum utilitarian
welfare for 100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of #
agents and # outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9451 0.9652 0.9722 0.9678 0.9759 0.9634
5 0.9171 0.9309 0.9421 0.9377 0.9335 0.9004
7 0.8926 0.9324 0.9171 0.9277 0.9121 0.8856
10 0.8921 0.9014 0.91 0.9094 0.9056 0.8873
15 0.893 0.9013 0.8911 0.9049 0.8984 0.8774
20 0.8948 0.9001 0.8909 0.9047 0.9049 0.8941
Table 3. Average ratio of utilitarian welfare the NMP rule to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.75 0.6397 0.5333 0.4815 0.4333 0.3743
5 0.625 0.3919 0.4244 0.4592 0.4956 0.403
7 0.5833 0.492 0.3632 0.5102 0.5599 0.5799
10 0.5834 0.375 0.4952 0.4253 0.5689 0.5696
15 0.5129 0.5525 0.57 0.4361 0.5198 0.5817
20 0.6001 0.625 0.5927 0.5525 0.6425 0.5656
Table 4. Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under EGAL to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9325 0.9256 0.8838 0.8075 0.844 0.8408
5 0.8482 0.8484 0.781 0.8019 0.82 0.8175
7 0.8221 0.8131 0.7817 0.7978 0.7992 0.8118
10 0.8176 0.8049 0.7902 0.7639 0.8152 0.7803
15 0.8267 0.807 0.7805 0.7476 0.8259 0.8009
20 0.8414 0.8278 0.8121 0.7748 0.8265 0.8084
Table 5. Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under EGAL to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333
5 0.8 0.7333 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8667
7 0.75 0.7619 0.8571 0.8214 0.8857 0.8571
10 0.8 0.8 0.8714 0.86 0.8667 0.8833
15 0.8 0.8444 0.8583 0.8417 0.8741 0.8815
20 0.8038 0.85 0.8773 0.9 0.8944 0.8727
Table 6. Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under CUT to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9333 0.9717 0.9717 0.9867 0.9867 0.995
5 0.9372 0.9452 0.959 0.9748 0.969 0.9757
7 0.9139 0.9468 0.9549 0.9624 0.969 0.9778
10 0.9194 0.9383 0.9502 0.9586 0.9576 0.965
15 0.9263 0.9276 0.9483 0.9483 0.9567 0.9634
20 0.9195 0.9332 0.9486 0.955 0.9588 0.9631
Table 7. Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under CUT to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333 0.8333
5 0.7778 0.7 0.7778 0.7778 0.7 0.8
7 0.7679 0.75 0.8036 0.75 0.7943 0.7778
10 0.7778 0.7737 0.7596 0.8116 0.7684 0.8031
Table 8. Minimum ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitarian welfare for
100 profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
|N | ↓ |A| → 3 5 7 10 15 20
3 0.9483 0.9733 0.9883 0.99 0.9867 0.9933
5 0.8992 0.9302 0.9351 0.9471 0.9512 0.962
7 0.8851 0.8952 0.9143 0.9182 0.929 0.9305
10 0.8839 0.89 0.8911 0.8969 0.9 0.8997
Table 9. Average ratio of utilitarian welfare under RP to maximum utilitarian welfare for 100
profiles draws under impartial culture assumption for each combination of # agents and #
outcomes.
Experiments: inefficiency of CUT
|N | × |A| 10% 25% 33% 50% 75%
5 × 6 0 0 0 0 0
10 × 5 0 0 0 0 0
5 × 15 0 0.045000 0.050000 0 0
10 × 10 0 0.037037 0.025000 0.012500 0
10 × 20 0.027778 0.041667 0.033333 0.008000 0
10 × 30 0.050000 0.039583 0.027619 0.007937 0
20 × 20 0.031250 0.009524 0.007000 0.001852 0
20 × 30 0.026316 0.023611 0.009387 0.001515 0
20 × 40 0.027018 0.012500 0.006206 0.001786 0
20 × 60 0.035227 0.019236 0.008758 0.001777 0
30 × 30 0.017857 0.003580 0 0 0
40 × 60 0.007232 0 0 0 0
50 × 50 0.001096 0 0 0 0
Table 10. The worst inefficiency ofU cut ; 200000 draws for each level.
|N | × |A| 10% 25% 33% 50% 75%
5 × 6 0 0 0 0 0
10 × 5 0 0 0 0 0
5 × 15 0 0 0.000257 0 0
10 × 10 0 0.000008 0.000006 0.000001 0
10 × 20 0.000005 0.000168 0.000069 0.000009 0
10 × 30 0.000163 0.000236 0.000086 0.000016 0
20 × 20 0.000010 0.000001 0 0 0
20 × 30 0.000051 0.000002 0.000002 0 0
20 × 40 0.000127 0.000004 0.000001 0 0
20 × 60 0.000344 0.000007 0.000001 0 0
30 × 30 0.000002 0 0 0 0
40 × 60 0 0 0 0 0
50 × 50 0 0 0 0 0
Table 11. The average inefficiency ofU cut ; 200000 draws for each level.
